Koala Corp

Commodity Fraud

Dear VALUED client and colleague,

   Koala Corp has spent countless hours and money educating our employees, associates, affiliates, suppliers, buyers and colleagues in "Commodity Fraud". The following is to introduce, educate, and/or update your company with the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) and their Commercial Crime Services (C.C.S.) fraud alerts.

                                                  

  • Commodity Fraud / Shipping Documents
  • London Short Order Form Guarantee and 3034 or 3039
  • Non-Circumvention, Non-Disclosure Agreements
  • 4-1-9 Scam
  • Identity Theft
  • Blocked Funds

    

Commodity Fraud / Shipping Fraud

Koala Corp expresses, that even though the following article posted by the I.C.C. mentions specific commodities, it is the “shipping documents” that are the main focus and main concern.

Warning by International Chamber of Commerce

On 25th July 1991, a Bulgarian buyer paid US$3.8 million for 13,100 tonnes of Brazilian sugar by letter of credit. The payment was released by International banks on the basis of the usual documents which proved that the sugar was loaded on 17th July in the port of Santos on the m.v. Giovanna bound for Varna, Bulgaria.

 

Neither the ship nor the sugar existed and the criminals have never been brought to justice. 


In August 1992 a Paris bank released US$2.89 million under a letter of credit on the basis of documents stating that 10,000 tonnes of white refined sugar had been loaded on the m.v. Vladimir Ilyich in Panama, bound for Kalingrad, Russia.

 

The documents were forgeries and the money has never been recovered.


Diamonds can be faked and old master paintings can be forged, but commodities are easily measured and tested and are rarely of sufficient value to attract forgers. With commodites, the fraudulent transaction is almost invariably based on a consignment which does not physically exist. Although surprising at first glance, this potential arises because bureaucracies everywhere have engendered a belief in the authority of paperwork. Just as worthless paper money is accepted as having value, so pieces of paper are accepted as having value, so pieces of paper are accepted as proof that a consignment of a specific commodity exists. The ordinary man does not go to his central bank to check his wealth in gold - he relies on a statement of account on a bit of paper. By the same token, commodity documentation is taken on trust. It is only necessary to forge documents showing the existence of a consignment and to find someone to buy it.

 

Victims of fraud are almost always attracted by expectations of exceptional profit. They succumb more to their own greed than anything else. A deal which is too good to be true probably isn't true - yet people around the world queue up every day for all manner of schemes which could not logically be genuine. Commodities are openly traded on all the world's major commodity exchanges and their prices are exactly established. There are several long-standing international commodity traders of the highest repute. Offers to sell commodities at less than the ruling market price makes no commercial sense - unless the real motive is fraud. This has been a standard ploy since time immemorial: to make the victim believe that he has access to a phenomenal deal; so good that he wants to keep it secret. This enables the fraudulent seller to conceal detailed information about the origins and location of the commodity. The buyer thinks he is on to something no-one else knows about, which will make him a quick profit, and doesn't care too much about the origins of the commodity or why it is cheap, so long as it is genuine - and the documents appear to protect him on this point. To allay suspicions a fraudulent seller will often offer various assurances which seem to give protection, or at least to vindicate his character. He may lodge a performance bond equal to say, 2% of the value. He is then risking 2% in the hands of an honest buyer in order to swindle him of the remaining 98%. He may provide various attestations from banks as to his financial worth (of no legal value or protection). He may offer to supply secret information about the exact location and origins of the commodity in return for, say, 10% part payment, either as a means of consolidating the deal or simply to abscond with the part payment. Provision of unnecessary quasi-official documentation is another tactic; any bit of paper which seems to confirm the existence of the commodity provides further re-assurance. Victims are usually surprised and even outraged when they discover that the international banking system provided absolutely no protection against payments made on the basis of fraudulent documents. They fail to understand the rules of international payments systems and the division of responsibility between themselves and the banking system.


The common commodity fraud utilizes the normal international trading practice of payment via irrevocable letter of credit. The buyer first arranges for his bank to issue a letter of credit. This is a legal undertaking by the bank, not the buyer, to make payment when certain specified documentation is provided which "proves" the commodity exists and is in transit to the buyer or at some agreed location - documents the fraudster of course intends to forge. Note that it is the bank which gives the undertaking, albeit at the buyer's expense. The letter of credit is also irrevocable so the buyer is now entirely in the hands of his bank and the seller. Any alteration to the terms of a letter of credit must be agreed by both parties, so the buyer is powerless even if he becomes suspicious. The crucial point is that banks deal solely in documents, not commodities. They are protected by international banking rules (the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits) which stipulate that a bank must honor a letter of credit if the specified documents are presented and are correct on their face. They have neither obligation nor incentive to question the documents; only that they apparently accord with those specified and there is nothing which suggests forgery. In point of fact banks have more incentive to detect forged currency notes or checks, where they stand the loss themselves.


It is up to the buyer to make independent checks. For example, in the case of the US$3.8 Million fraud described above, it would have been simple to establish with Lloyds Register of Shipping that the m.v. Giovanna was nowhere near the Brazilian port of Santos in July 1991. It had been renamed the m.v. Styliani in 1983 and broken up for scrap in Pakistan in 1984.


Do you think you're safe with Deferred Payment? Indonesian trade fraud leaves paper trail.

London, 24 February 2006: ICC’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has uncovered five cases of trade fraud in the shipping of paper and board products from Indonesia in the past three months.

IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan said: “All five of the frauds recently reviewed by IMB have involved the same exporter and Non Vessel Operating Common Carrier (NVOCC). In each case, buyers paid for goods that were never shipped. We suspect there are several more such cases that have gone unreported.”

The scheme is being run out of East Java by fraudsters who lure potential victims with attractive prices for paper and board products. Once the buyer is prepared to make a purchase, the seller persuades them to open a letter of credit, often on a deferred payment basis. It is then claimed that shipments − averaging half a dozen full container loads − have been arranged via a NVOCC. When contacted about the missing shipment the “exporter” then defers responsibility to the NVOCC and denies any accountability.

“The containers are purported to hold products from legitimate Indonesian paper and board companies, but the bills of lading issued are fraudulent and the goods are never shipped,” stated Captain Mukundan. “IMB has been in contact with buyers from the Middle East and Canada who have lost hundreds of thousands of dollars through this scam.”

IMB’s investigation has revealed that the fraudsters had developed a convincing website that could lead buyers to believe they were dealing with an authentic company. However, the bills of lading used do not list any street address or telephone number for the NVOCC − only the website address. “This is highly irregular and leaves the buyer with no means of contacting the NVOCC once the goods fail to arrive,” said Captain Mukundan.

It is suspected that initial contact with potential buyers is often made through a business intermediary, trade fairs or via the Internet. IMB strongly advises that paper and board importers around the world exercise caution and perform due diligence when sourcing consignments from unknown sellers in Indonesia. The alternatives − attempting to recover assets or order banks to stop payment through the Indonesian court system − can prove both difficult and costly.

IMB’s document checking service has extensive experience with trade finance fraud of this nature and is available to review bills of lading and validate their authenticity.


Prevention

.

The conduct of commodity frauds suggests elementary extra prudence regarding:

1. Commodities offered at unrealistic, too good to be true, prices.

2. Undisclosed details of the seller or origin or any air of secrecy.

3. Performance Bonds or deposits.

4. Involvement in countries previously targeted e.g. buyers in India, China, Hong Kong, the Middle East or Eastern Europe and commodities sourced from Latin America, the Philippines or Thailand.

5. Independently checking any ship, its location, and its cargo.

6. Any unusual specification of the commodity or documents.

Further Action

.

The best long-term defense is to ensure that fraudulent stories are well-publicized. Any information should be given to the International Chamber of Commerce, which has taken the initiative in gathering intelligence and advising those at risk.

 

 

Last Thought

 

 

Before you transact with any new company for the first time, Koala Global strongly suggest using the I.C.C., Commercial Crime Service's Financial Investigation Bureau. Designed to be of most use to banks, other financial services companies, law and accountancy firms, and individual investors, FIB will:

  • Verify the bona fides of parties to any financial transaction before funds are paid.
  • Investigate financial fraud and money laundering schemes, and identify those involved.
  • Track, trace and attempt to recover assets lost by victims of financial fraud.
  • Bring fraudsters to the attention of law enforcement and provide expert witness testimony if required to help secure a conviction.

The key to avoid becoming a victim is knowledge, vigilance and swift reaction. Membership of FIB will help you know what to expect and what to do when danger threatens. It enables companies and individuals to invest and do business around the world with confidence whenever they see an opportunity.

     

 London Short Order Form Guarantee and 3034 or 3039

.

The I.C.C. Commercial Crime Services (C.C.S.), has warned banks and traders about the increasing use of a fraudulent financial document called 'London Short Form 3034'.

C.C.S. says the document has the appearance of a genuine financial document and is being used by traders as a form of credit. It is warning banks that this form is not authorized or issued by any financial institution.

To read more about this from the I.C.C. please click on the following link:

http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/3034.asp

http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/stories/fakefund.asp

.

  

 

Non-Circumvention, Non-Disclosure Agreements

 

 

Koala Corp, has strived to inform the International Community about the misrepresentation and/or fraudulent NCNDA. Many Traders and Brokers in the International Community (who may have NO idea) are currently using or have entered into a NCNDA, that may NOT hold value and/or may NOT be binding. This type of NCNDA contains references regarding the I.C.C. provisions, publications, and/or regulations 400, 500 or 600. No such I.C.C. Documents and Rules exist. The only I.C.C. published documents that pertain to "Confidentiality" and "Non-Circumvention / Non-Disclosure" are I.C.C. publications 664 and 619.

 

To read more about this from the I.C.C. please click on the following link:

 

http://www.iccwbo.org/icccihag/index.html

 

http://members.uscib.org/Shop/Core/Orders/product.aspx?catid=37&prodid=65 

 

http://members.uscib.org/Shop/Core/Orders/product.aspx?catid=37&prodid=35  

 

 

4-1-9 Scam ("419")

 

 

Writers of these messages often claim to be a relative of a former national leader, brought down by a military coup. They obtain your address and/or e-mail usually through B2B Trade Boards. They claim their families have millions of dollars locked up in accounts that they are unable to access because of hostility from the new rulers or some other tragic reasoning.

On other occasions they claim to represent government departments with tens of millions of dollars to transfer abroad. The con-artists ask their victims to help them transfer the money secretly to a foreign bank account in exchange for a percentage of the money transferred.

To read more about this from the I.C.C. please click on the following link:

http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2002/stories/nigeria.asp

.

   

Indentity Theft
.

The C.C.S. has learned that the Jersey Financial Services Commission (JFSC) experienced several occasions where bank mail destined for South Africa was intercepted at postal sorting facilities.

In these cases, the bank's letterhead was doctored and a bogus 'Form W8888' was inserted into customer mail. The forged documentation, allegedly issued by the Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, urged the recipient to complete the form as a non-resident citizen wishing to claim exemption from Channel Island tax.

The forged letter suggested that the bank is required by law to update its records and that the customer is obliged to re-certify their tax exemption status.

The customer was requested to fax the completed form back to a specific phone number, but this number was in no way associated with the bank sending the original correspondence. The completed form contained all the information and personal details required for fraudsters to contact the bank and withdraw or transfer funds.

To read more about this from the I.C.C. please click on the following link:

http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/fraud_scam.asp

.

 
Blocked Funds

 

After a nine-year absence, Blocked Funds frauds appear to be making a comeback. Following reports of a recent case, the I.C.C.'s Commercial Crime Services (C.C.S.) is warning banks to be on their guard, and to avoid any transactions involving Blocked Funds Letters.

The C.C.S.'s Jon Merrett explains: "In 1995, there were a series of frauds involving the use of Blocked Funds Letters as fake collateral. Despite their apparent credibility, they weren't legal financial instruments nine years ago, and they still aren't today."

Merrett warns, "In addition to being aware of this scam, banks should also take care to ensure that these letters are not issued in their name, or they risk finding themselves liable for subsequent transactions involving this 'ghost' money."

To read more about this from the I.C.C. please click on the following link:

http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news_archives/2003/blocked_funds.asp

.

 

We hope that this information has been useful, to assist your company in choosing a future trading partner with integrity. Koala Corp hopes that you will keep your company and it’s employees updated through the I.C.C. website.  

Subscribe for FREE to find out the latest I.C.C. news, seminars, and products.